# # This is the "master security properties file". # # An alternate java.security properties file may be specified # from the command line via the system property # # -Djava.security.properties= # # This properties file appends to the master security properties file. # If both properties files specify values for the same key, the value # from the command-line properties file is selected, as it is the last # one loaded. # # Also, if you specify # # -Djava.security.properties== (2 equals), # # then that properties file completely overrides the master security # properties file. # # To disable the ability to specify an additional properties file from # the command line, set the key security.overridePropertiesFile # to false in the master security properties file. It is set to true # by default. # In this file, various security properties are set for use by # java.security classes. This is where users can statically register # Cryptography Package Providers ("providers" for short). The term # "provider" refers to a package or set of packages that supply a # concrete implementation of a subset of the cryptography aspects of # the Java Security API. A provider may, for example, implement one or # more digital signature algorithms or message digest algorithms. # # Each provider must implement a subclass of the Provider class. # To register a provider in this master security properties file, # specify the Provider subclass name and priority in the format # # security.provider.= # # This declares a provider, and specifies its preference # order n. The preference order is the order in which providers are # searched for requested algorithms (when no specific provider is # requested). The order is 1-based; 1 is the most preferred, followed # by 2, and so on. # # must specify the subclass of the Provider class whose # constructor sets the values of various properties that are required # for the Java Security API to look up the algorithms or other # facilities implemented by the provider. # # There must be at least one provider specification in java.security. # There is a default provider that comes standard with the JDK. It # is called the "SUN" provider, and its Provider subclass # named Sun appears in the sun.security.provider package. Thus, the # "SUN" provider is registered via the following: # # security.provider.1=sun.security.provider.Sun # # (The number 1 is used for the default provider.) # # Note: Providers can be dynamically registered instead by calls to # either the addProvider or insertProviderAt method in the Security # class. # # List of providers and their preference orders (see above): # security.provider.1=sun.security.provider.Sun security.provider.2=sun.security.rsa.SunRsaSign security.provider.3=sun.security.ec.SunEC security.provider.4=com.sun.net.ssl.internal.ssl.Provider security.provider.5=com.sun.crypto.provider.SunJCE security.provider.6=sun.security.jgss.SunProvider security.provider.7=com.sun.security.sasl.Provider security.provider.8=org.jcp.xml.dsig.internal.dom.XMLDSigRI security.provider.9=sun.security.smartcardio.SunPCSC # # Sun Provider SecureRandom seed source. # # Select the primary source of seed data for the "SHA1PRNG" and # "NativePRNG" SecureRandom implementations in the "Sun" provider. # (Other SecureRandom implementations might also use this property.) # # On Unix-like systems (for example, Solaris/Linux/MacOS), the # "NativePRNG" and "SHA1PRNG" implementations obtains seed data from # special device files such as file:/dev/random. # # On Windows systems, specifying the URLs "file:/dev/random" or # "file:/dev/urandom" will enable the native Microsoft CryptoAPI seeding # mechanism for SHA1PRNG. # # By default, an attempt is made to use the entropy gathering device # specified by the "securerandom.source" Security property. If an # exception occurs while accessing the specified URL: # # SHA1PRNG: # the traditional system/thread activity algorithm will be used. # # NativePRNG: # a default value of /dev/random will be used. If neither # are available, the implementation will be disabled. # "file" is the only currently supported protocol type. # # The entropy gathering device can also be specified with the System # property "java.security.egd". For example: # # % java -Djava.security.egd=file:/dev/random MainClass # # Specifying this System property will override the # "securerandom.source" Security property. # # In addition, if "file:/dev/random" or "file:/dev/urandom" is # specified, the "NativePRNG" implementation will be more preferred than # SHA1PRNG in the Sun provider. # securerandom.source=file:/dev/random # # A list of known strong SecureRandom implementations. # # To help guide applications in selecting a suitable strong # java.security.SecureRandom implementation, Java distributions should # indicate a list of known strong implementations using the property. # # This is a comma-separated list of algorithm and/or algorithm:provider # entries. # securerandom.strongAlgorithms=NativePRNGBlocking:SUN # # Class to instantiate as the javax.security.auth.login.Configuration # provider. # login.configuration.provider=sun.security.provider.ConfigFile # # Default login configuration file # #login.config.url.1=file:${user.home}/.java.login.config # # Class to instantiate as the system Policy. This is the name of the class # that will be used as the Policy object. # policy.provider=sun.security.provider.PolicyFile # The default is to have a single system-wide policy file, # and a policy file in the user's home directory. policy.url.1=file:${java.home}/lib/security/java.policy policy.url.2=file:${user.home}/.java.policy # whether or not we expand properties in the policy file # if this is set to false, properties (${...}) will not be expanded in policy # files. policy.expandProperties=true # whether or not we allow an extra policy to be passed on the command line # with -Djava.security.policy=somefile. Comment out this line to disable # this feature. policy.allowSystemProperty=true # whether or not we look into the IdentityScope for trusted Identities # when encountering a 1.1 signed JAR file. If the identity is found # and is trusted, we grant it AllPermission. policy.ignoreIdentityScope=false # # Default keystore type. # keystore.type=jks # # Controls compatibility mode for the JKS keystore type. # # When set to 'true', the JKS keystore type supports loading # keystore files in either JKS or PKCS12 format. When set to 'false' # it supports loading only JKS keystore files. # keystore.type.compat=true # # List of comma-separated packages that start with or equal this string # will cause a security exception to be thrown when # passed to checkPackageAccess unless the # corresponding RuntimePermission ("accessClassInPackage."+package) has # been granted. package.access=sun.,\ com.sun.xml.internal.,\ com.sun.imageio.,\ com.sun.istack.internal.,\ com.sun.jmx.,\ com.sun.media.sound.,\ com.sun.naming.internal.,\ com.sun.proxy.,\ com.sun.corba.se.,\ com.sun.org.apache.bcel.internal.,\ com.sun.org.apache.regexp.internal.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.extensions.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.lib.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.res.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.templates.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.utils.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xslt.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.cmdline.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.compiler.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.util.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.res.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.resolver.helpers.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.resolver.readers.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.security.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.utils.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.utils.,\ com.sun.org.glassfish.,\ com.oracle.xmlns.internal.,\ com.oracle.webservices.internal.,\ oracle.jrockit.jfr.,\ org.jcp.xml.dsig.internal.,\ jdk.internal.,\ jdk.nashorn.internal.,\ jdk.nashorn.tools.,\ jdk.xml.internal.,\ com.sun.activation.registries. # # List of comma-separated packages that start with or equal this string # will cause a security exception to be thrown when # passed to checkPackageDefinition unless the # corresponding RuntimePermission ("defineClassInPackage."+package) has # been granted. # # by default, none of the class loaders supplied with the JDK call # checkPackageDefinition. # package.definition=sun.,\ com.sun.xml.internal.,\ com.sun.imageio.,\ com.sun.istack.internal.,\ com.sun.jmx.,\ com.sun.media.sound.,\ com.sun.naming.internal.,\ com.sun.proxy.,\ com.sun.corba.se.,\ com.sun.org.apache.bcel.internal.,\ com.sun.org.apache.regexp.internal.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.extensions.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.lib.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.res.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.templates.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.utils.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xslt.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.cmdline.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.compiler.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.util.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.res.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.resolver.helpers.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.resolver.readers.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.security.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.utils.,\ com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.utils.,\ com.sun.org.glassfish.,\ com.oracle.xmlns.internal.,\ com.oracle.webservices.internal.,\ oracle.jrockit.jfr.,\ org.jcp.xml.dsig.internal.,\ jdk.internal.,\ jdk.nashorn.internal.,\ jdk.nashorn.tools.,\ jdk.xml.internal.,\ com.sun.activation.registries. # # Determines whether this properties file can be appended to # or overridden on the command line via -Djava.security.properties # security.overridePropertiesFile=true # # Determines the default key and trust manager factory algorithms for # the javax.net.ssl package. # ssl.KeyManagerFactory.algorithm=SunX509 ssl.TrustManagerFactory.algorithm=PKIX # # The Java-level namelookup cache policy for successful lookups: # # any negative value: caching forever # any positive value: the number of seconds to cache an address for # zero: do not cache # # default value is forever (FOREVER). For security reasons, this # caching is made forever when a security manager is set. When a security # manager is not set, the default behavior in this implementation # is to cache for 30 seconds. # # NOTE: setting this to anything other than the default value can have # serious security implications. Do not set it unless # you are sure you are not exposed to DNS spoofing attack. # #networkaddress.cache.ttl=-1 # The Java-level namelookup cache policy for failed lookups: # # any negative value: cache forever # any positive value: the number of seconds to cache negative lookup results # zero: do not cache # # In some Microsoft Windows networking environments that employ # the WINS name service in addition to DNS, name service lookups # that fail may take a noticeably long time to return (approx. 5 seconds). # For this reason the default caching policy is to maintain these # results for 10 seconds. # # networkaddress.cache.negative.ttl=10 # # Properties to configure OCSP for certificate revocation checking # # Enable OCSP # # By default, OCSP is not used for certificate revocation checking. # This property enables the use of OCSP when set to the value "true". # # NOTE: SocketPermission is required to connect to an OCSP responder. # # Example, # ocsp.enable=true # # Location of the OCSP responder # # By default, the location of the OCSP responder is determined implicitly # from the certificate being validated. This property explicitly specifies # the location of the OCSP responder. The property is used when the # Authority Information Access extension (defined in RFC 3280) is absent # from the certificate or when it requires overriding. # # Example, # ocsp.responderURL=http://ocsp.example.net:80 # # Subject name of the OCSP responder's certificate # # By default, the certificate of the OCSP responder is that of the issuer # of the certificate being validated. This property identifies the certificate # of the OCSP responder when the default does not apply. Its value is a string # distinguished name (defined in RFC 2253) which identifies a certificate in # the set of certificates supplied during cert path validation. In cases where # the subject name alone is not sufficient to uniquely identify the certificate # then both the "ocsp.responderCertIssuerName" and # "ocsp.responderCertSerialNumber" properties must be used instead. When this # property is set then those two properties are ignored. # # Example, # ocsp.responderCertSubjectName="CN=OCSP Responder, O=XYZ Corp" # # Issuer name of the OCSP responder's certificate # # By default, the certificate of the OCSP responder is that of the issuer # of the certificate being validated. This property identifies the certificate # of the OCSP responder when the default does not apply. Its value is a string # distinguished name (defined in RFC 2253) which identifies a certificate in # the set of certificates supplied during cert path validation. When this # property is set then the "ocsp.responderCertSerialNumber" property must also # be set. When the "ocsp.responderCertSubjectName" property is set then this # property is ignored. # # Example, # ocsp.responderCertIssuerName="CN=Enterprise CA, O=XYZ Corp" # # Serial number of the OCSP responder's certificate # # By default, the certificate of the OCSP responder is that of the issuer # of the certificate being validated. This property identifies the certificate # of the OCSP responder when the default does not apply. Its value is a string # of hexadecimal digits (colon or space separators may be present) which # identifies a certificate in the set of certificates supplied during cert path # validation. When this property is set then the "ocsp.responderCertIssuerName" # property must also be set. When the "ocsp.responderCertSubjectName" property # is set then this property is ignored. # # Example, # ocsp.responderCertSerialNumber=2A:FF:00 # # Policy for failed Kerberos KDC lookups: # # When a KDC is unavailable (network error, service failure, etc), it is # put inside a blacklist and accessed less often for future requests. The # value (case-insensitive) for this policy can be: # # tryLast # KDCs in the blacklist are always tried after those not on the list. # # tryLess[:max_retries,timeout] # KDCs in the blacklist are still tried by their order in the configuration, # but with smaller max_retries and timeout values. max_retries and timeout # are optional numerical parameters (default 1 and 5000, which means once # and 5 seconds). Please notes that if any of the values defined here is # more than what is defined in krb5.conf, it will be ignored. # # Whenever a KDC is detected as available, it is removed from the blacklist. # The blacklist is reset when krb5.conf is reloaded. You can add # refreshKrb5Config=true to a JAAS configuration file so that krb5.conf is # reloaded whenever a JAAS authentication is attempted. # # Example, # krb5.kdc.bad.policy = tryLast # krb5.kdc.bad.policy = tryLess:2,2000 krb5.kdc.bad.policy = tryLast # Algorithm restrictions for certification path (CertPath) processing # # In some environments, certain algorithms or key lengths may be undesirable # for certification path building and validation. For example, "MD2" is # generally no longer considered to be a secure hash algorithm. This section # describes the mechanism for disabling algorithms based on algorithm name # and/or key length. This includes algorithms used in certificates, as well # as revocation information such as CRLs and signed OCSP Responses. # The syntax of the disabled algorithm string is described as follows: # DisabledAlgorithms: # " DisabledAlgorithm { , DisabledAlgorithm } " # # DisabledAlgorithm: # AlgorithmName [Constraint] { '&' Constraint } # # AlgorithmName: # (see below) # # Constraint: # KeySizeConstraint | CAConstraint | DenyAfterConstraint | # UsageConstraint # # KeySizeConstraint: # keySize Operator KeyLength # # Operator: # <= | < | == | != | >= | > # # KeyLength: # Integer value of the algorithm's key length in bits # # CAConstraint: # jdkCA # # DenyAfterConstraint: # denyAfter YYYY-MM-DD # # UsageConstraint: # usage [TLSServer] [TLSClient] [SignedJAR] # # The "AlgorithmName" is the standard algorithm name of the disabled # algorithm. See "Java Cryptography Architecture Standard Algorithm Name # Documentation" for information about Standard Algorithm Names. Matching # is performed using a case-insensitive sub-element matching rule. (For # example, in "SHA1withECDSA" the sub-elements are "SHA1" for hashing and # "ECDSA" for signatures.) If the assertion "AlgorithmName" is a # sub-element of the certificate algorithm name, the algorithm will be # rejected during certification path building and validation. For example, # the assertion algorithm name "DSA" will disable all certificate algorithms # that rely on DSA, such as NONEwithDSA, SHA1withDSA. However, the assertion # will not disable algorithms related to "ECDSA". # # A "Constraint" defines restrictions on the keys and/or certificates for # a specified AlgorithmName: # # KeySizeConstraint: # keySize Operator KeyLength # The constraint requires a key of a valid size range if the # "AlgorithmName" is of a key algorithm. The "KeyLength" indicates # the key size specified in number of bits. For example, # "RSA keySize <= 1024" indicates that any RSA key with key size less # than or equal to 1024 bits should be disabled, and # "RSA keySize < 1024, RSA keySize > 2048" indicates that any RSA key # with key size less than 1024 or greater than 2048 should be disabled. # This constraint is only used on algorithms that have a key size. # # CAConstraint: # jdkCA # This constraint prohibits the specified algorithm only if the # algorithm is used in a certificate chain that terminates at a marked # trust anchor in the lib/security/cacerts keystore. If the jdkCA # constraint is not set, then all chains using the specified algorithm # are restricted. jdkCA may only be used once in a DisabledAlgorithm # expression. # Example: To apply this constraint to SHA-1 certificates, include # the following: "SHA1 jdkCA" # # DenyAfterConstraint: # denyAfter YYYY-MM-DD # This constraint prohibits a certificate with the specified algorithm # from being used after the date regardless of the certificate's # validity. JAR files that are signed and timestamped before the # constraint date with certificates containing the disabled algorithm # will not be restricted. The date is processed in the UTC timezone. # This constraint can only be used once in a DisabledAlgorithm # expression. # Example: To deny usage of RSA 2048 bit certificates after Feb 3 2020, # use the following: "RSA keySize == 2048 & denyAfter 2020-02-03" # # UsageConstraint: # usage [TLSServer] [TLSClient] [SignedJAR] # This constraint prohibits the specified algorithm for # a specified usage. This should be used when disabling an algorithm # for all usages is not practical. 'TLSServer' restricts the algorithm # in TLS server certificate chains when server authentication is # performed. 'TLSClient' restricts the algorithm in TLS client # certificate chains when client authentication is performed. # 'SignedJAR' constrains use of certificates in signed jar files. # The usage type follows the keyword and more than one usage type can # be specified with a whitespace delimiter. # Example: "SHA1 usage TLSServer TLSClient" # # When an algorithm must satisfy more than one constraint, it must be # delimited by an ampersand '&'. For example, to restrict certificates in a # chain that terminate at a distribution provided trust anchor and contain # RSA keys that are less than or equal to 1024 bits, add the following # constraint: "RSA keySize <= 1024 & jdkCA". # # All DisabledAlgorithms expressions are processed in the order defined in the # property. This requires lower keysize constraints to be specified # before larger keysize constraints of the same algorithm. For example: # "RSA keySize < 1024 & jdkCA, RSA keySize < 2048". # # Note: The algorithm restrictions do not apply to trust anchors or # self-signed certificates. # # Note: This property is currently used by Oracle's PKIX implementation. It # is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations. # # Example: # jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms=MD2, DSA, RSA keySize < 2048 # # jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms=MD2, MD5, SHA1 jdkCA & usage TLSServer, \ RSA keySize < 1024, DSA keySize < 1024, EC keySize < 224 # # Algorithm restrictions for signed JAR files # # In some environments, certain algorithms or key lengths may be undesirable # for signed JAR validation. For example, "MD2" is generally no longer # considered to be a secure hash algorithm. This section describes the # mechanism for disabling algorithms based on algorithm name and/or key length. # JARs signed with any of the disabled algorithms or key sizes will be treated # as unsigned. # # The syntax of the disabled algorithm string is described as follows: # DisabledAlgorithms: # " DisabledAlgorithm { , DisabledAlgorithm } " # # DisabledAlgorithm: # AlgorithmName [Constraint] { '&' Constraint } # # AlgorithmName: # (see below) # # Constraint: # KeySizeConstraint | DenyAfterConstraint # # KeySizeConstraint: # keySize Operator KeyLength # # DenyAfterConstraint: # denyAfter YYYY-MM-DD # # Operator: # <= | < | == | != | >= | > # # KeyLength: # Integer value of the algorithm's key length in bits # # Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference # implementation. It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other # implementations. # # See "jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms" for syntax descriptions. # jdk.jar.disabledAlgorithms=MD2, MD5, RSA keySize < 1024, DSA keySize < 1024 # # Algorithm restrictions for Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security # (SSL/TLS) processing # # In some environments, certain algorithms or key lengths may be undesirable # when using SSL/TLS. This section describes the mechanism for disabling # algorithms during SSL/TLS security parameters negotiation, including # protocol version negotiation, cipher suites selection, peer authentication # and key exchange mechanisms. # # Disabled algorithms will not be negotiated for SSL/TLS connections, even # if they are enabled explicitly in an application. # # For PKI-based peer authentication and key exchange mechanisms, this list # of disabled algorithms will also be checked during certification path # building and validation, including algorithms used in certificates, as # well as revocation information such as CRLs and signed OCSP Responses. # This is in addition to the jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms property above. # # See the specification of "jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms" for the # syntax of the disabled algorithm string. # # Note: The algorithm restrictions do not apply to trust anchors or # self-signed certificates. # # Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation. # It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations. # # Example: # jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms=MD5, SSLv3, DSA, RSA keySize < 2048 jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms=SSLv3, RC4, DES, MD5withRSA, DH keySize < 1024, \ EC keySize < 224, 3DES_EDE_CBC # Legacy algorithms for Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) # processing in JSSE implementation. # # In some environments, a certain algorithm may be undesirable but it # cannot be disabled because of its use in legacy applications. Legacy # algorithms may still be supported, but applications should not use them # as the security strength of legacy algorithms are usually not strong enough # in practice. # # During SSL/TLS security parameters negotiation, legacy algorithms will # not be negotiated unless there are no other candidates. # # The syntax of the legacy algorithms string is described as this Java # BNF-style: # LegacyAlgorithms: # " LegacyAlgorithm { , LegacyAlgorithm } " # # LegacyAlgorithm: # AlgorithmName (standard JSSE algorithm name) # # See the specification of security property "jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms" # for the syntax and description of the "AlgorithmName" notation. # # Per SSL/TLS specifications, cipher suites have the form: # SSL_KeyExchangeAlg_WITH_CipherAlg_MacAlg # or # TLS_KeyExchangeAlg_WITH_CipherAlg_MacAlg # # For example, the cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uses RSA as the # key exchange algorithm, AES_128_CBC (128 bits AES cipher algorithm in CBC # mode) as the cipher (encryption) algorithm, and SHA-1 as the message digest # algorithm for HMAC. # # The LegacyAlgorithm can be one of the following standard algorithm names: # 1. JSSE cipher suite name, e.g., TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA # 2. JSSE key exchange algorithm name, e.g., RSA # 3. JSSE cipher (encryption) algorithm name, e.g., AES_128_CBC # 4. JSSE message digest algorithm name, e.g., SHA # # See SSL/TLS specifications and "Java Cryptography Architecture Standard # Algorithm Name Documentation" for information about the algorithm names. # # Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation. # It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations. # There is no guarantee the property will continue to exist or be of the # same syntax in future releases. # # Example: # jdk.tls.legacyAlgorithms=DH_anon, DES_CBC, SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 # jdk.tls.legacyAlgorithms= \ K_NULL, C_NULL, M_NULL, \ DH_anon, ECDH_anon, \ RC4_128, RC4_40, DES_CBC, DES40_CBC, \ 3DES_EDE_CBC # The pre-defined default finite field Diffie-Hellman ephemeral (DHE) # parameters for Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS/DTLS) processing. # # In traditional SSL/TLS/DTLS connections where finite field DHE parameters # negotiation mechanism is not used, the server offers the client group # parameters, base generator g and prime modulus p, for DHE key exchange. # It is recommended to use dynamic group parameters. This property defines # a mechanism that allows you to specify custom group parameters. # # The syntax of this property string is described as this Java BNF-style: # DefaultDHEParameters: # DefinedDHEParameters { , DefinedDHEParameters } # # DefinedDHEParameters: # "{" DHEPrimeModulus , DHEBaseGenerator "}" # # DHEPrimeModulus: # HexadecimalDigits # # DHEBaseGenerator: # HexadecimalDigits # # HexadecimalDigits: # HexadecimalDigit { HexadecimalDigit } # # HexadecimalDigit: one of # 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F a b c d e f # # Whitespace characters are ignored. # # The "DefinedDHEParameters" defines the custom group parameters, prime # modulus p and base generator g, for a particular size of prime modulus p. # The "DHEPrimeModulus" defines the hexadecimal prime modulus p, and the # "DHEBaseGenerator" defines the hexadecimal base generator g of a group # parameter. It is recommended to use safe primes for the custom group # parameters. # # If this property is not defined or the value is empty, the underlying JSSE # provider's default group parameter is used for each connection. # # If the property value does not follow the grammar, or a particular group # parameter is not valid, the connection will fall back and use the # underlying JSSE provider's default group parameter. # # Note: This property is currently used by OpenJDK's JSSE implementation. It # is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations. # # Example: # jdk.tls.server.defaultDHEParameters= # { \ # FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 \ # 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD \ # EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 \ # E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED \ # EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE65381 \ # FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF, 2} # Cryptographic Jurisdiction Policy defaults # # Import and export control rules on cryptographic software vary from # country to country. By default, the JDK provides two different sets of # cryptographic policy files: # # unlimited: These policy files contain no restrictions on cryptographic # strengths or algorithms. # # limited: These policy files contain more restricted cryptographic # strengths, and are still available if your country or # usage requires the traditional restrictive policy. # # The JDK JCE framework uses the unlimited policy files by default. # However the user may explicitly choose a set either by defining the # "crypto.policy" Security property or by installing valid JCE policy # jar files into the traditional JDK installation location. To better # support older JDK Update releases, the "crypto.policy" property is not # defined by default. See below for more information. # # The following logic determines which policy files are used: # # refers to the directory where the JRE was # installed and may be determined using the "java.home" # System property. # # 1. If the Security property "crypto.policy" has been defined, # then the following mechanism is used: # # The policy files are stored as jar files in subdirectories of # /lib/security/policy. Each directory contains a complete # set of policy files. # # The "crypto.policy" Security property controls the directory # selection, and thus the effective cryptographic policy. # # The default set of directories is: # # limited | unlimited # # 2. If the "crypto.policy" property is not set and the traditional # US_export_policy.jar and local_policy.jar files # (e.g. limited/unlimited) are found in the legacy # /lib/security directory, then the rules embedded within # those jar files will be used. This helps preserve compatibility # for users upgrading from an older installation. # # 3. If the jar files are not present in the legacy location # and the "crypto.policy" Security property is not defined, # then the JDK will use the unlimited settings (equivalent to # crypto.policy=unlimited) # # Please see the JCA documentation for additional information on these # files and formats. # # YOU ARE ADVISED TO CONSULT YOUR EXPORT/IMPORT CONTROL COUNSEL OR ATTORNEY # TO DETERMINE THE EXACT REQUIREMENTS. # # Please note that the JCE for Java SE, including the JCE framework, # cryptographic policy files, and standard JCE providers provided with # the Java SE, have been reviewed and approved for export as mass market # encryption item by the US Bureau of Industry and Security. # # Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation. # It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations. # #crypto.policy=unlimited # # The policy for the XML Signature secure validation mode. The mode is # enabled by setting the property "org.jcp.xml.dsig.secureValidation" to # true with the javax.xml.crypto.XMLCryptoContext.setProperty() method, # or by running the code with a SecurityManager. # # Policy: # Constraint {"," Constraint } # Constraint: # AlgConstraint | MaxTransformsConstraint | MaxReferencesConstraint | # ReferenceUriSchemeConstraint | KeySizeConstraint | OtherConstraint # AlgConstraint # "disallowAlg" Uri # MaxTransformsConstraint: # "maxTransforms" Integer # MaxReferencesConstraint: # "maxReferences" Integer # ReferenceUriSchemeConstraint: # "disallowReferenceUriSchemes" String { String } # KeySizeConstraint: # "minKeySize" KeyAlg Integer # OtherConstraint: # "noDuplicateIds" | "noRetrievalMethodLoops" # # For AlgConstraint, Uri is the algorithm URI String that is not allowed. # See the XML Signature Recommendation for more information on algorithm # URI Identifiers. For KeySizeConstraint, KeyAlg is the standard algorithm # name of the key type (ex: "RSA"). If the MaxTransformsConstraint, # MaxReferencesConstraint or KeySizeConstraint (for the same key type) is # specified more than once, only the last entry is enforced. # # Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation. It # is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations. # jdk.xml.dsig.secureValidationPolicy=\ disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xslt-19991116,\ disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-md5,\ disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-md5,\ disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#md5,\ maxTransforms 5,\ maxReferences 30,\ disallowReferenceUriSchemes file http https,\ minKeySize RSA 1024,\ minKeySize DSA 1024,\ minKeySize EC 224,\ noDuplicateIds,\ noRetrievalMethodLoops # # Serialization process-wide filter # # A filter, if configured, is used by java.io.ObjectInputStream during # deserialization to check the contents of the stream. # A filter is configured as a sequence of patterns, each pattern is either # matched against the name of a class in the stream or defines a limit. # Patterns are separated by ";" (semicolon). # Whitespace is significant and is considered part of the pattern. # # If the system property jdk.serialFilter is also specified, it supersedes # the security property value defined here. # # If a pattern includes a "=", it sets a limit. # If a limit appears more than once the last value is used. # Limits are checked before classes regardless of the order in the sequence of patterns. # If any of the limits are exceeded, the filter status is REJECTED. # # maxdepth=value - the maximum depth of a graph # maxrefs=value - the maximum number of internal references # maxbytes=value - the maximum number of bytes in the input stream # maxarray=value - the maximum array length allowed # # Other patterns, from left to right, match the class or package name as # returned from Class.getName. # If the class is an array type, the class or package to be matched is the element type. # Arrays of any number of dimensions are treated the same as the element type. # For example, a pattern of "!example.Foo", rejects creation of any instance or # array of example.Foo. # # If the pattern starts with "!", the status is REJECTED if the remaining pattern # is matched; otherwise the status is ALLOWED if the pattern matches. # If the pattern ends with ".**" it matches any class in the package and all subpackages. # If the pattern ends with ".*" it matches any class in the package. # If the pattern ends with "*", it matches any class with the pattern as a prefix. # If the pattern is equal to the class name, it matches. # Otherwise, the status is UNDECIDED. # # Primitive types are not configurable with this filter. # #jdk.serialFilter=pattern;pattern # # RMI Registry Serial Filter # # The filter pattern uses the same format as jdk.serialFilter. # This filter can override the builtin filter if additional types need to be # allowed or rejected from the RMI Registry or to decrease limits but not # to increase limits. # If the limits (maxdepth, maxrefs, or maxbytes) are exceeded, the object is rejected. # # The maxdepth of any array passed to the RMI Registry is set to # 10000. The maximum depth of the graph is set to 20. # These limits can be reduced via the maxarray, maxdepth limits. # #sun.rmi.registry.registryFilter=pattern;pattern # # Array construction of any component type, including subarrays and arrays of # primitives, are allowed unless the length is greater than the maxarray limit. # The filter is applied to each array element. # # The built-in filter allows subclasses of allowed classes and # can approximately be represented as the pattern: # #sun.rmi.registry.registryFilter=\ # maxarray=1000000;\ # maxdepth=20;\ # java.lang.String;\ # java.lang.Number;\ # java.lang.reflect.Proxy;\ # java.rmi.Remote;\ # sun.rmi.server.UnicastRef;\ # sun.rmi.server.RMIClientSocketFactory;\ # sun.rmi.server.RMIServerSocketFactory;\ # java.rmi.activation.ActivationID;\ # java.rmi.server.UID # # RMI Distributed Garbage Collector (DGC) Serial Filter # # The filter pattern uses the same format as jdk.serialFilter. # This filter can override the builtin filter if additional types need to be # allowed or rejected from the RMI DGC. # # The builtin DGC filter can approximately be represented as the filter pattern: # #sun.rmi.transport.dgcFilter=\ # java.rmi.server.ObjID;\ # java.rmi.server.UID;\ # java.rmi.dgc.VMID;\ # java.rmi.dgc.Lease;\ # maxdepth=5;maxarray=10000 # CORBA ORBIorTypeCheckRegistryFilter # Type check enhancement for ORB::string_to_object processing # # An IOR type check filter, if configured, is used by an ORB during # an ORB::string_to_object invocation to check the veracity of the type encoded # in the ior string. # # The filter pattern consists of a semi-colon separated list of class names. # The configured list contains the binary class names of the IDL interface types # corresponding to the IDL stub class to be instantiated. # As such, a filter specifies a list of IDL stub classes that will be # allowed by an ORB when an ORB::string_to_object is invoked. # It is used to specify a white list configuration of acceptable # IDL stub types which may be contained in a stringified IOR # parameter passed as input to an ORB::string_to_object method. # # Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation. # It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations. # #com.sun.CORBA.ORBIorTypeCheckRegistryFilter=binary_class_name;binary_class_name # # JCEKS Encrypted Key Serial Filter # # This filter, if configured, is used by the JCEKS KeyStore during the # deserialization of the encrypted Key object stored inside a key entry. # If not configured or the filter result is UNDECIDED (i.e. none of the patterns # matches), the filter configured by jdk.serialFilter will be consulted. # # If the system property jceks.key.serialFilter is also specified, it supersedes # the security property value defined here. # # The filter pattern uses the same format as jdk.serialFilter. The default # pattern allows java.lang.Enum, java.security.KeyRep, java.security.KeyRep$Type, # and javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec and rejects all the others. jceks.key.serialFilter = java.lang.Enum;java.security.KeyRep;\ java.security.KeyRep$Type;javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;!*